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The MX Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) is designed ~o be the 
most lethal strategic ballistic missile in the world. It is being developed 
by the U.S. Air Force to augment the capabilities of the presently deployed 
ICBM force, which together with Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) 
and manned strategic bomber aircraft form the triad of U.S. strategic 
nuclear offensive forces. On June 7, 1979, President Carter announced his 
decision to proceed with full-scale development of a 192,000-15. MX, the 
largest design proposed. 
MX is also intended to be much more survivable than the fixed-silo-based 
Minuteman and Titan ICBMs currently deployed. Since survivability depends on 
how the missile is based, the U.S. has searched for more than a decade for a 
survivable yet politically acceptable basing mode for MX. On Sept. 7, 1979, 
President Carter announced plans to deploy MX in a "shell game" system of 
multiple protective structures (MPS). On Oct. 2, 1981, President Reagan 
announced his strategic program. He recommended rejecting MPS basing. 
Instead, he recommended basing MX initially in superhard silos as an interim 
measure beginning in 1986. The U.S. would also study three basing modes that 
offer the prospect of long-term survivability for MX: antiballistic missile 
defense, .continuous airborne patrol, and deep undergrounc! basing. ay 1984, 
the U.S. woula select one or more of these modes for deployment. 
The debate over the MX program focuses on need, cost, lethality, basing 
mode, arms control implications, and alternatives. This issue brief 
concentrates on the MX missile and its strategic implications. Ot5er aspects 
are covered in CRS Issue arief 81165, The MX aasing Debate: The Reagan Plan 
and Alternatives and Mini Brief 81254, The Reagan Plan for U.S. Strategic 
forces: Issues for Congress. 
SACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
EARLY HISTORY 
MX technology was generated by the Advanced ICBM Technology Program, 
which, as originally proposed, was to investigate methods to extend the life 
and increase the capabilities of the Minuteman ICBMs. However, in 1971 the 
Strategic Air Command (SAC) documented the requirements for an advanced ICBM, 
and an advanced development program for the MX began in late 1973 as part of 
the Advanced ICBM Technology Program. (Advanced development is the stage of 
research and development (R&D) preceding full-scale engineering development, 
which is the last R&D stage before a production decision is made.) 
In planning future ICBM force effectiveness, SAC envisioned three separate 
but complementary requirements for the MX: quantity and quality of its 
warheads; continued ICBM force survivability; and maintenance of strategic 
superiority, or at least "rough equivalence," with respect to the Soviet 
strategic forces. 
The design specifications called for a large ICBM possessing the following 
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q u a l l t ~ e s :  large throw-werght (to p a r t ~ a l l y  correct tne asymmetry ~n 
throw-werght when compared to Sovret ICBMs); hlgh survrvabrllty (moblle, and 
hardened to sustarn shock and electromagnecrc pulse (EKP) caused by enemy 
attack on ~ t s  launch srtes); hlgh accuracy (to enLance the lethalrty of its 
nuclear warheads agarnst hard targets); and more multiple lndependectly 
targetable reentry v e h ~ c l e s  (MIRVs) per rnlsslle chan the Mlnuceman 111, the 
only currently deployed MIRVed U.S. ICBM. 
PURPOSE AND DESCRI?TION O F T H E  MX ICBM 
The MX will be smaller than the Soviets' largesr IC3M, =he SS-18, but will 
have military capability equivalent or superior tC the SS-18. 'PX will be 
larger than t3e Minuteman 111. Added throw-weight, accuracy, nuclear 
hardness, and mobility are the* chief features of che ?1X design. It will have 
a 92-inch-diameter body, three solid-propellant stages, a liquid-fueled 
post-boost vehicle, and a gimballess Advanced Inertial Reference Sphere 
(AiRS) . 
The MX guidance system, the heart and brains of which are AIRS and a 
microminiaturized computer, will retain its accuracy after being transported 
and stored horizontally. This feature will contribute to its readiness. The 
guidance system is installed so that components can be replaced without first 
r e m ~ v i n g  the reentry vehicle bus as is done on the Minuteman 111. 
The Air Force is developing ballistic and maneuvering reentry vehicles for 
the ?!X through the Advanced Sailistic Reentry Systems (ABRES) ?rogran. Two 
reentry vehicles (RVs) are under consideration for MX -- the Mk-12A and the 
advanced ballistic reentry vehicle, with yields estimated at 335 and 500 
kiloc.cns, respectively. While XX i s  e x ~ e c t e d  to carry 1 0  Kk-12As, "it will 
be designed to carry twelve MK-12A RVs or eleven Advanced Ballistic Reentry 
Vehicles should the SALT I1 limit of ten RVs not be obtained," according :o 
Lt.Gen. Kelly Bnrke, USAF Depucy Chief of Staff fcr Zesearch, Development, 
and Acquisition. In contrast, :he Minuteman I11 carries three Mk-12 RVs of 
about 170-kiloton yield, though the Mk-12s on 300 of zhe 550 Minuteman 111s 
currently deployed are being replaced with Mk-12As. (See Senate Foreign 
Relations Connittee hearings, "The SALT I1 Treaty," July 1979, part I ,  p. 
458; and House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations COnmitteeS, 
"Fiscal Year 1982 Arms Control Impact State!r,entsfw February 1981, p. 3.) 
Each MK-12A, combined with the MX's accuracy improvements, will be much more 
able to destroy hard targets than Minuteman I11 warheads. 
The following table summarizes the estimated general characteristics of 
t h e m o s t  important U.S. and Soviet ICBMs currently deployed or being 
deployed, and the dates of their Initial Cperational Capability ( I O C ) .  
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Table 1 
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED U.S. AND SOVIET MIRVed ICBMs 
U.S. U.S.S.R. 
Designation MINUTSMAN 111 MX SS-17 . SS-18 SS-19 
INS20/Mkl2A (a) mod i mod 4 mod 1 
I OC 1979 1986 1975 1979 1974 
Length (f t) 60 70.6 79? 115 8 2 
Diameter (ft) 5.5 7.7 8? 10 9 
stages 3 (b) 3 (5) 2 2 2 
Weight (lbs) 78,000 1'32,000 ? ? ? 
Propellant solid (5) solid (b) liquid liquic! liquid 
Guidance inertial inertial inertial inertial inertial 
Launching Mode hot cold cold cold hot 
Basing Mode silo TBD silo silo silo 
Throw Weight (lbs) 1,975-2,400 7,900 6,025 16,700 7,525 
Range (nm) LT 6,900 6 OQO- 4,800 4,800 4,300 
No. of RVs 3 10 (c) 4 10 6 
Yield ( k t )  335 335/500 750 500 550 
CEP (nm) 0.12 0.10/0.05 0.24 0.14 0.21 
SSKP (d) 0.54 0.76-0.39 0.35 Q.62 0.38 
Lethality K/RV (e) 33.5 192.9(f) 14.3 32.1 15.2 
Lethality K/DV (e) 100.5 1929.4 57.3 321.4 91.4 
Glossary: 
MIRVed: carries multiple independently targetable reentry 
vehicles. 
TBD: To be determ~ned. 
IOC: initial operational capability. 
Throw weight: weight of payload (nuclear weapons, weapon 
shielding for reentry, penetration aids, etc.) of the missile. 
nm: nautical miles (6,080 ft.). 
LT: Less than. 
RV: reentry vehicle. 
Yield: explosive force of a weapon. 
kt: kiloton, a measure of yleld equal to the explosive force 
of 1,000 tons of TNT. 
CEP: circular error probable, a measure of accuracy; if large 
numbers of the same type of warhead from the same type of missile 
were shot at a s ~ n g l e  point target, the CEP would be the radius 
of the circle within which half the warheads landed. 
SSKP: single shot kill probability. 
K: see note (e) . 
DV: delivery vehicle (e-g., an ICBM). 
Notes: 
(a) INS-20 is a more accurate inertial navigation system than used 
on earlier v-ersions of Minuteman 111; Mk-12A is a 335-kt RV. 
(b) Both Minuteman I11 and MX have 3 large solid fuel stages that 
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p r o v i d e  m o s t  o f  e a c h  m i s s i l e ' s  r a n g e  a n d  t h r o w - w e i g h t  
c a p a b i l i t y  a n d  a l i q u i d  f u e l  p o s t - b o o s t  v e h i c l e  (PBV) t h a t  
m a n e u v e r s  e a c h  2 V  o n t o  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  t r a j e c t o r y .  B e c a u s e  M X ' s  
p o s t - b o o s t  v e h i c l e  i s  l a r g e ,  MX i s  o f t e n  t e r m e d  a 4 - s t a g e  
m i s s i l e .  
( 2 )  MX i s  d e s i g c e d  t o  c a r r y  11 a d L 7 a n c e d  b a l l i s t i c  r e e n t r y  
v e h i c l e s  ( 5 0 0  k t )  o r  1 2  Xk-12A R ' J s  ( 3 3 5 k t ) .  
( d )  C a l c u l a t e e  f o r  e a c h  w a r h e a d  l i s t e d  a g a i n s t  a  s h e l c e r  
h a r e e n e d  t o  w i t h s t a n d  a n u c l e a r  b l a s t  o v e r p r e s s ~ r e  o f  2 0 0 0  
p o u n d s  p e r  s q u a r e  i n c h .  
( e )  L e t h a l i t y  (K) i s  a m e a s u r e  o f  a S i i i t y  t o  d e s t r o y  h a r d  
t a r g e t s .  I t  ' i s  d i r e c t l y  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  2 / 3  p o w e r  o f  
y i e l d  i n  n e g a t o n s  (1 m e g a t o n  = 1 0 0 0  k i l o t o n s )  a n d  i n v e r s e l y  
p r o p o r t i o z a l  t o  t h e  s q u a r e  o f  CEP i n  nm. 
(f) 2 a l c u l a t e C  f ~ r  a 3 3 5  k t  R V  w i t h  a  CEP o f  - 0 5  nm. 
S o u r c e s :  
T h e  d a t a  i n  t h i s  t a b l e  a r e  f r o m  o p e n  s o u r c e s .  A l l  d a t a  o n  
t h r o w  w e i g h t ,  r a n g e ,  y i e l d ,  a n d  CEP a r e  f r o m  J o h n  C o l l i n s ,  U . S . - S o v i e t  
M i l i t a r y  B a l a n c e :  C o n c e p t s . a n d  C a p a b i l i t i e s ,  1 9 5 0 - 1 9 8 0 .  ( E c G r a w - H i l l  
P u S l i c a t i o n  C o . ,  1 9 8 0 ) :  4 4 6 - 4 4 7 ,  e x c e p :  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  
-- 2 4 0 0 - l b  t h r o w  w e i g h t  f o r  M i n u t e m a n  111. P a u l  K i t z e ,  i n  U .S .  
S e n a t e .  C o m m i t t e e  o n  F o r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s .  H e a r i n g s :  T h e  
SALT I 1  T r e a t y  ( 1 9 7 9 )  : p t .  1 ,  p .  4 5 8 .  
-- MX t h r o w  w e i g h t :  A e r o s p a c e  D a i l y ,  l e b .  5 ,  1 9 8 0 :  1 8 7 .  
-- MX r a n q e :  -DMS M a r k e t  I n t e l l i g e n c e  P e p o r : ,  " K X , "  ( G r e e n w i c h ,  
C t :  1 9 7 9 )  : 1. - - ~ i n u t e m a n  I 1 1  y i e l d :  N i t z e ,  T k e  SALT I 1  T r e a t y :  p t .  1 ,  
p .  4 5 8 .  
- - MX y i e l d  a n C  CEP: B e r b e r t  S c o v i l i e ,  J r . ,  M X :  P r e s c r i p t i o n  
f o r  D i s a s t e r  ( C a m b r i d g e ,  M a s s . :  KIT  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 1 ) :  1 6 .  -- E i n u t e m a n  1 1 1  r a n g e :  C o l l i n s  l i s t s  a r a n g e  o f  a b o u t  5 , 9 0 0  
nm f o r  M i n u t e m a n  I 1 1  a r m e d  w i t h  MK 1 2  R V s .  S i n c e  Mkl2A i s  
s o m e w h a t  h e a v i e r  t h a n  M k l 2 ,  t h e  M k l 2 A - a r m e d  M i n u t e m a n  1 1 1 ' s  
r a n g e  w i l l  b e  s o m e w h a t  l e s s  t h a n  t h a t  o f  t h e  M k 1 2 - a r m e d  
v e r s i o n .  
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THE BASING MODE 
It is widely believed that the Soviets will be able to destroy 90% or so 
of U.S. IC3Ms in the early 1980s. On Aug. 20, 1980, Defense Secretary Brown 
said they may already "threaten our fixed Minuteman silos." This anticipated 
vulnerability arises because the ICSMs are based in fixed silos, and because 
Soviet ICBM accuracy is increasing. If U.S. ICBMs were made mobile, the 
threat posed to them by accurate Soviet ICBMs would be reduced. Congress has 
therefore insisted repeatedly over the past few-years that any new U.S. IC3K 
be based only in a mobile mode. 
The United Scates has considered more than 30 mobile basing modes since 
the early 1960s. Most fall into two categories: (i) free mobile syscems, in 
which missiles are moved on trains, trucks, aircraft, submarines, ecc., over 
large areas, often hundreds of thousands of square miles, and are not tied to 
fixed shelters; and (2) multiple protective structure (MPS) systems, in which 
missiles are shuttled among a large number of shelters. 
Citing the strategic difficulties of any type of MPS, President Reagan on 
Oct. 2, 1981, rejected that system and proposed basing MX in superhard silos 
(i.e., with high resistance to nuclear weapon effects) initially, and later 
in a more survivaSle basing mode. On Dec. 2, the Senate passed, 90-4, an 
amendment by Senator Cohen to H.R. 4995, the ' Y 8 2  33D appropriations bill, 
=hat limited the expenditure of funds on superhardening and called for a 
Ceeision on a permanent MX basing mode by July 1 ,  1983. The House adopted no 
such amendment, so the issue now goes to conference. The Administration 
recognized that silos would not do much to redress vulnerability, but argued: 
(1) Superhard silos would create additional 
uncertainties for Soviet war planners, 
reducing their confidence that they could 
destroy most MXs. 
( 2 )  Silos are the only way to avoid delaying MX 
deployment beyond 1986, when MX will become : 
operational. The Administration noted: "Early 
deployment of MX will break the Soviet monopoly 
or prompt counter-ICBM CapaSilities." 
(3) Silos are an interim basing mode. The U.S. 
will conduct R&D on three modes that offer 
longer term survivability: continuous airborne 
patrol aircraft, deep underground basing, and 
antiballistic missile (ABM) defense of MXs. By 
1984, the Administration will select one or more 
of these modes for MX deployment. 
Critics respond: 
(1) The additional uncertainties created by superhard silos 
will be minimal. Since the Soviets are improving 
the accuracy of their ICBMs, they can more than 
offset any improvement in silo hardening. 
They can also use several RVs and/or very large 
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RVs against each silo to improve their chances 
of destroying silos. 
( 2 )  Silo-based MX, with 1,000 counter-ICBM RVs, will be 
the most attractive U.3. strategic targets; 
the Soviets wlll have a huge ~ n c e n t l v e  to 
concentrate RVs on t2ern. They will be able Zo 
do that because znere will be no decoy targets; 
unllke MPS, each sllo w ~ l l  c o n t a ~ n  a mlssile. 
Deploying MX in superhard silos will be very expensive. 
(See Cost section, Selow, for detai1s.j Since the 
U.S. can have confidence chat only a few MXs would 
survive, critics reject silo basing as not cost 
effective and recommend that che U.S. nove 
directly to a long-term survivanle basing mode. 
By deploying MX in si;os, the U.S. gains 
considerable counterforce capability, but only 
if it attacks preemptively. Why spend 
billions, critics ask, for a mission we do sot 
intend to carry out? 
Silos and other Sasing modes are discussed in more detail. in CRS issue 
3rief 61165, The MX Basing Debate: The Reagan ?lan and Alternatives. 
MX, SALT, AND ABM 
The Administration was quite negative on near-term prospects for ABM. It 
said: 
. . .  today, ballistic missile defense technology 
is not at the stage where it could proviSe an adequate 
defense against Soviet missiles. Tor the future, we are 
not yet sure how well ballistic missile defenses will work; 
what they will cost; how Soviet Sallistic missile 
defenses -- which would almost certainly be deployed in 
response to any U.S. missile defense system -- would 
affect U.S. and allied offensive capabilities; and what 
would be the political ramifications of altering the 
ABM Treaty. 
3 y  terminating MPS, the Administration greatly reduced prospects for 
deploying any U.S. A3M in the near term, barring Soviet ABW deployment. The 
Low Altitude Defense (LOAD) ABM, the U.S. ABM nearest to deploymenc, could be 
deployed as a stand-alone defense only in connection with MPS. It would 
exploit the leverage offered b y  MPS, intercepting only the warheads headed 
for the one of 2 3  shelters containing missiles. 
LOAD is generally through to be ineffective by itself in defending silos 
because it could be overwhelmed. Instead, the U.S. would need another type 
of ABM, "layered defense." This would use two tiers, an overlay with 
long-range interceptor missiles to destroy warheads in space, and an underlay 
with short-range interceptors like LOAD. The overlay would break up 
precisely structured attacks, while the underlay would intercept warheads 
that leak through. 
The overlay, however, is in early stages of development, and would use 
frontier technology. Yet it must be very good to have any substantial 
military value. Critics and those involved with A3M development would agree 
with the Office of Technology Assessment's view that "?or the moment, it 
would be quite risky to rely on the Overlay, or on layered defense, as the 
basis for EX basing." - 
In rejecting MPS, then, the Administration greatly reduced: prospects for 
the only ABM the U.S. could deploy in the next few years; any advantage the 
U.S. could gain by withdrawing from or seeking to renegotiate the A B M  Treaty 
in the 1982 five-year review of that treaty; and pressure to do that for the 
next several years af least. See Issue Brief 81003, Antiballistic 
Missiles. 
COST 
Regarding FY82 costs, the President's FY82 MX request was amended to 
$1.950 billion following the Oct. 2 announcement. The FY82 DOD Authorization 
Act, P.L. 97-86 ( S .  815), reduced that figure co $1.8752 billion. Of that 
latter figure, $1.575 billion is for missile development. The remainder, 
$300.2 million, is for basing, of which $10 million is for deep underground 
basing and the rest is for basing MX in hard silos. The conferees agreed 
thac no funds authorized by this act could be used for R&D of an aircraft 
launching mode for MX. 
- ror FY82 DOD appropriations, the House Appropriations Committee 
recommended providing $1.913 Sillion for MX, of which $1.349 billion was for 
missile R&Dl and $564 million was for basing R&D. (H.R. 4995) The House did 
nor change these provisions. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended 
appropriating $2.009 billion for MX, of which $1.575 billion was for missile 
development, $354 million was for planning and design of interim basing, $10 
million was for R&D on continuous airborne patrol basing, $10 million was for 
2 & D  on deep underground basing, and $60 million was for a 3% inflation 
add-on. (S. 1857/H.R. 4995) The Senate did not change these amounts. The 
bill now goes to conference. 
Superhardening the silos that will hold KX accounts for only a part of the 
total cost of silo basing. Kuch design work is required to put MX in silos, 
whether or not the silos are superhardened. The Air Force estimates that for 
FY82, less than 10% of the silo basing funds are for hardening, and across 
the five-year defense plan less than 20% of those funds are for hardening. 
Regarding total MX costs, a preliminary Air Force estimate, as of Oct. 30, 
1981, is that R&D and procurement of 226 MX missiles (for deployment, test, 
and spares) will cost $13.8 billion exclusive of nuclear weapon material 
(FY82 dollars). The Air Force's preliminary estimate of basing costs as of 
that date is that 18 Titan silos, modified and superhardened for MX, plus 
infrastructure (e.g., depot facilities, test equipment, facilities associated 
with test launches, and maintenance equipment), would cost $6.2 billion; 36 
modified Titan silos plus infrastructure would cost $7.8 billion; and 40 
modified Minuteman 111 silos plus infrastructure would cost $5.6 billion (all 
in FY82 dollars). DOD has provided a detailed breakout of silo basing costs; 
see Congressional Record, Dec. 2, 1981: S14282. The following table presents 
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the Air Force estimate of the R&D cost of continuous patrol aircraft and deep 
underground basing through 1984, and, of the funds scheduled and approved by 
DOD for the Army to use through 1984 on ballistic missile defense, that part 
of the funds in direct support of the President's decision 06 MX basing in 
1984. 
Cost (FP82 doilars in millions) 
FY82 PV83 CY84 Total 
eontlcuous patrol 




defense 2 5 3 6 7 2  521 i 5 5 6  
Total 283 382 1141 2 4 0 6  
The ultimate cost of the MX and its basing aodes is uncertain, given that 
the long-term basing apzions for K X , h a v e  not Seen developed, the mode or 
nodes for deployment have not been selected, and the number of inissiles to b e  
deployed in each mode has no= been determined. 
The current schedule calls for the first MX flight test in January 1983. 
The Administration states that MX will be deployed in silos in 1986, and chat 
"we will have a Setter system" for basing MX by "the late 1980s." 
ISSUES 
The MX program is highly c O R t r o V e r ~ i a 1 .  Salient issues include its need, 
cost, warhead lethality, and arms control implications. 
Need 
Proponents justify the program, a s  follows: 
-- The MX will narrow the U.S./U.S.S.R. 
ICBM throw-weight asymmetry. 
-- The MX is needed a s  a counterforce weapon capable of 
destroying reloadable silos basing the cold-launched 
SS-17s and-SS-18s, ICBMs held in reserve, command centers, 
and other military targets. 
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-- ICBMs are vulnerable now, or soon will Be. The Soviets 
have been improving ICBM accuracy dramatically and 
deploying many accurate ICSMs. Silo basing is the only way 
to avoid delaying MX deployment. It will make Soviet 
planners iess cocfiCent in their ability to destroy 
MX for several years. By the late 1980s, we will deploy 
MX in a Sasing mode that affects =he prospect of 
greater survivability for the missile. 
Critics respond: 
-- The United States currently has many thousands of 
independently targetable strategic nuclear weapons (aSout 
50% more than the U.S.S.R. has) -- more than enough 
to target any foreseeable increase in the number 
of potential strategic targets in the Soviet Union. 
-- The hardening of potential Soviet targets can be dealt with by: 
(a) deploying MK-12A 4Vs on Minuteman 111s; 
(b) increasing the navigation accuracy 
of our ballistic-missile launching submarines 
through the use of the Global Positioning System; and 
( c )  deploying the Trident 11 SLBM and crxise missiles. 
-- A l i ~ i t e d  attack on U.S. ICBKs scarcely seems credible. 
The U.S. would have SLBMs and bombers surviving, and 
might launch ICBMs on warning of attack. The Soviets 
would also be deterred by doubts about the vulnerability 
of U.S. ICBMs, the immense difficulties of coordinating 
an attack, and the disaster resulting if the attack 
fails. In any event, silo basing leaves MX highly 
vulneraSle even if the silos are "superhard." With five years' 
advance notice, the Soviets will be able to improve ICBM 
accuracy enough to offset extra hardening. 
cost 
Critics argue: 
- - For a fraction of the cost of the MX program we could deploy 
thousands of land-based nuclear-armed cruise missiles 
in the NATO countries, and balance the Soviet 
deployment of the SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missiles 
( IRBMs) . 
- - A less expensive and more survivable alternative to the MX is to 
deploy additional nuclear-powered ballistic-missile-launching 
submarines or the smallsub 'undersea mobile (SUM) system. 
The Trident 11, when deployed in 1989, will Se able to 
destroy Soviet ICBM silos. 
-- Even silo basing will be extremely expensive. 
Proponents of the MX system respond: 
- - The maintenance, security, and operational costs of the MX 
system will not be greater than for other systems of similar 
complexity. 
-- Strategic cruise missiles, although less expensive 
than MX, are too slow for attacking time-critical targets such 
a ICBM silos and are too vulnerable to cerminal defenses. 
-- Alchough SLBMs currently ~ f f e r  an azzractlve alternatrve to the 
MX 1n cerms of iower r n r t ~ a l  cost and recnced vulnerab:lity, 
(a) SLBMs are less relrable and acccraze zhan ICSMS; 
(5) SL3Ms are more expensave ta malnca:n 
cnan ICBMs; and (2) af the survlvabrlaty cf the U.S. 
ICBMs 1 s  not rmproved and the Sovlets develop 
antlsuSnarine warfare (ASW) cechnrques that 
would n e u t r a l ~ z e  cne s e a - ~ a s e d  portlon of the U.S. strateqlc trrad 
we could be placed rn a p o s l t ~ o n  of straceglc ~ n f e r l o r l t y .  
- - The expense of constructing alternate basing for our IC3Ks 
will eventually have to be incurred if che U.S. i s  to reduce the 
vulnerability of ics ICBMs to the Soviet strategic offensive 
counterforce weapocs such as che SS-18s and SS-19s. 
-- Silo basing is the only way open LC deploy MX a s  soon a s  it 
is availaSle. 
Warkead Lethality 
Feehaps the most s l g n ~ f r c a n t  strategic controversy regardrng MX 1s the 
p r e d ~ c t e d  accuracy of rzs warheads -- a basrc rngreclent of ics lethalrty. 
ieznallty 1s a quantrcaclve measuremen: that denotes che hard-target 
sapa3r:lt:~ possessed by a nuclear weapon. In t5e past =he Sovrets have 
Zerrved a respectable degree of lethality from thelr ICBMs by armrng them 
wren h l g h - y ~ e l d  warheads (e.g., tne SS-9 carrres ore 20 KT 2 V .  See Colllns, 
Jchn: 3.5.-Sovret M r l ~ t a r y  Salance, p. 416.) The new generaelon sf Sovret 
IC3Ks, however, have considerable r ~ p r o v e m e r t s  ln accuracy and throw-welght 
over thelr predecessors. In contrast, U.S. efforzs to rncrease the lethalrty 
of lts ICBMs has prrmarlly consisted of accuracy rmprovements to all of the 
Mlndteman IIIs, and the su3stitutron of some of the YK-12 MIRVs w ~ t h  
hrgher-yreld MK-12A MIRVs. 
Critics of the high accuracy being designed into the MX argue: 
-- The MX i s  a counterforce weapon for destroying the 
Soviet ICBM silos, Secause each of its 10 RVs will have 
sufficient lethality to crush 3000 psi-hardened 
cargets (the maximum compressive strength of 
concrete, the Farent material of silos, is about 
3000 psi) with a kill probability of about 98.2%. 
-- The anti-silo capability designed into the MX 
is inconsistent with the U.S.-proclaimed policy 
of deterrence by threat of assured-destruct1011 
retaliation, because a hard-target counterforce 
capability i s  only necessary fcr supporting 
preemptive-attack or first-strike postures. 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































missiles and KX. 
-- The Sovlets wlll vrew MX as permlttlng a U.S. flrst 
strlke. They wlll respond by deploying more SS-17, 
SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs than currently pr0;ected; 
lncreaslng the number of MI2Vs on thelr mlsslles; 
preparing to launch on warning of attack; and deploying 
land-mcblle ICEKs. These steps w ~ l l  reddce che 
l ~ k e l i h o o d  of a z t a ~ ~ l n g  arms control agreemenzs 
and wl9l lncrease the llkellhood of a Sovlet attack. 
-- We need not p a n ~ c  over fear of theoretical Elnuteman 
v u l n e r a b z l ~ t y .  Many t e c h n ~ c a ;  proSleFs prevent the Sovzets from 
destroying all M l ~ u t e m e r  s:mui:aneocsly. Eoreover, s z m ~ l t a n e o u s  
destructlon of all three elements of the crzad rs ~ m p o s s i b l e  
because of tho way 1t was designed. 
-- A "limited counterforce" response to a Soviet first strlke wculd 
result in cens of millions of deaths, blurring the distinction 
between the counterforce and couctervalue deterrence. 
-- Vulnerable missiles, such as XX in superhard silos, lnvite 
attack rather t2an deter it. 
LZGISLATION 
2 . L .  97-86, S. 815 
Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982. Reaorted from Senate 
Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 9?-58) on May 6. Provides thac no funds 
authorized by title I1 of the bill (Z&D) S e  obligated or expended for 
full-scale engineering development of an operational Sasing mode for EX 
unltss and until: (1) the President has submitted his decision to Congress, 
(2) the Secretary of Defense has justified the Cecision and zornpared 
alternatives, and (3) 6 0  days have elapsed during which the two ~ o u s e s  "have 
nor agreed to resolutions of their respective Houses exgressing disapproval 
of the ?resident's decision." Senator Levin zffered an amendment chat 
modified part 3 of the committee's bill so that no funds would be used 
unless, within 6 0  days of submission of the President's decision, both Houses 
"have agreed to a joint resolution expressing a?proval of the proposed basing 
mode." The amendment was tabled, 59-39, on May 13. S. 815 passed the Senate, 
amended, 92-1, on May 14. Conference completed Occ. 29. The conferees 
agreed to $1,875 million of the $1,950.2 million in the revised request for 
MX Z&D. Conference report filed in the House (H.Rept. 97-311) Nov. 3. 
Senate agreed to conference report Nov. 5; House agreed Nov. 1 7 ,  335-51. 
Signed into law Dec. 1 ,  1981. 
H . R .  1955 (Daschle et al.) 
Authorizes appropriations for FY82 for Navy RDT&E on the smallsub undersea 
mobile (SUM) system for launching ICBMs, including MX. Introduced Feb. 1 9 ,  
1981; referred to the House Armed Services Committee. 
H.R. 3455 (Brinkley et al.) 
Military Construction Authorization Act, 1982. Reported from House Armed 
Services Committee (H.Rept. 97-44) on May 15. Provides that no funds 
authorized by title 301 of the bill (Air Force COn~trUCtiOn) for MX be 
obligated or expended for an MX basing mode other than MPS unless the 
President certifies :hat it is in the national interest to develop a basing 
mode other than MPS, and within 6 0  days of submission of that decision 
Congress adopts a concurrent resolution approving the alternative basing mode 
selected by the President. Zepresentative Sizon offered an amendment very 
similar to the Senate Armed Services Committee's language on MX basing of S. 
615. Zis amendment was agreed to. Representative Marriott offered an 
amendment to the Simon amendment, having the Secretary of Defense recommend 
"a plan to mitigate the economic, social and cultural impacts of the selected 
basing mode on the affected State and local communities, including through 
t9e provision of Federal financial assistance," along with the justification 
of the President's basing mode and the comparison of alternatives. The 
amendment was agreed to. Measure passed House, amended, June 4, on 311-36 
voto. Referred to Senate Armed Services Committee June 8. Senate considered 
and passed H.R. 3455, amended, Nov. 5 ,  95-2. Because the Reagan plan for MX 
hasing did not call for MX military construction in FY82, the committee bill 
deleted the entire $356 million for that purpose. Measure reported from 
conference (H-Rept. 97-362) Dec. 7. 
X.R. 3519 (Price et al.) 
Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982. Zeported from Xouse 
Arned Services Committee (H.Rept. 97-71) on May 19. Section 203 of the bill 
provides $2,423.2 million for RDT&E on MX based in MPS; stated that 
development shall continue so as to achieve IOC S y  Dec. 31, 1986; and 
provided that KXJEPS funds cocld be used for a different basing mode, and the 
I3C.waived, if the President certifies that it is in the national interest to 
develop an MX Sasing mode other than MPS, and if, within 60 days of 
certification, Congress adopts a concurrent resolution approving development 
of the President's alternative basing mode. Representative Hansen offered an 
amendment to authorize the same sum for MX, with the sane IOC, but with the 
conditions set forth by the Senate version of S. 815: no funds used for a 
basing mode until (1) the President selects a basing mode, (2) the Secretary 
of Defense justifies that basing mode and compares alternatives; and (3) 6 0  
days elapse in which both Houses have not adopted resolutions expressing 
disapproval of developing the President's basing mode. Representative Simon 
offered an amendment to Hansen's amendment requiring eaeh House to adopt a 
resolution approving development of the President's basing mode within 6C 
Cays of submission of the President's decision. Simon's amendment was 
defeated, 207-201; Hansen's amendment was accepted by voice vote. 
Representative Dellums offered an amendment to delete all funds for MX/MPS. 
After rejecting a motion by Representative Stratton to limit debate, 213-193, 
the House rejected Dellums' amendment, 316-96. H.R. 3519, amended, passed 
the House, 354-63, on July 16. The House then passed S. 815 in lieu, amended 
to contain House language. 
H.R. 3954 (Santini et al.) 
Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide special impact assistance 
to State and local governments, and other entities, to mitigate adverse 
impacts on local communities of MX or the East Coast Trident submarine base. 
H.R. 4995 (Addabbo) 
Department of Defense Appropriations, 1982. Reported from House 
Appropriations Committee Nov. 16 (H.Rept. 97-333). The committee recommended 
appropriating the full amount the Air Force budgeted for MX, $1.913 billion, 
of which $1.349 billion was for R&D on the missile and $564.2 million was for 
R&D on baslng o p t ~ o n s .  On Nov. 1 8 ,  the House rezected, 139-264, a n  Addabbo 
amendment to delete a l l  R&D funds for MX mrsslle and baslng. The brll passed 
the Xouse, amended, 335-01, on Nov. 18. Measure considered ln the Senate 
Nov. 30-Dec. 4. On Dec. 2 ,  the Senate passed, 90-4, an amendment by Senator 
Cohen that llrnrted the expenditure of funds on s u p e r h a r d e n ~ n g  of srlos for MX 
and called for a declslon on a permanent XX baslng mode by July 1 ,  1983. 3 n  
Dec. 3, tne Senate relected, 35-60, an ainendmenc cy Senator Pryor to delete 
fLzd:ng for rnterzm s ~ l o  hardening for X X ,  and re:tcted, 45-4-, an anendment 
~y Senatar lroxrnlre co delece the 3% cosc growcn add-on for X X  and a-1. 
Measure passed Senate, amended, 84-5, on Dec. 4. 
H.Con.Res. 94 (aedell et al.) 
Zxpresses the sense of the Congress thac E?S Se halted nntll there 1 s  a 
negotlated l ~ m r t  on the number of ICBM launchers a n 2  MIRVs that tfie Sovzets 
nay have deployed at any tlme. Introduced Mar. 1 7 ,  1981; referred to :he 
House Armed Servlces Cornnrttee. 
S. 1408 (Thurmond) 
Military Construction Authorization A c t ,  1982. 3eported from Senate Arnee 
Services Committee (S.2epc. 97-141) June 22. The Committee recommended 
acthorizing the requestee funSing, $356 million, but prohiSited the use of 
these funds until the Administration completed its review of EX basing and 
Congress has 5 0  days for reviewing zhe Adrniniscrazion's basing decision. 
Measure indefinitely postponed in Senate Nov. 5 ,  with 3 . .  3455 passed in 
lieu. 
S. 1857 (Hatfield) 
Department of Defense Appropriations, 1982. 3eported from the Senate 
Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 97-273) Nov. 17. Recommended appropriating 
$2,008,706,000 for MX R&D, of which $1.575 billion is for R&D on the missile, 
$354 million is for R&D on planning and design for incerim silo basing, $10 
million i s  for ?.&D on continuous airborne patrol basing, and $10 million i s  
for 2s3 on deep underground basing. The latter two are long-ter~. Sasing 
oprions. 3 e  total also includes 3% for cost growth. 
S.Res. 241 (Levin et al.) 
Disapproves the basing mode for HX announced by the ?resident on Oct. 
Introduced Nov. 5; referred to the Senate Committee on Armed Services. 
See Defense Budget -- FY82 (IB81002). 
HEARINGS 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. 
Subcommittee on the Department of Defense. Department of 
Defense appropriations for 1981. Hearings, 96th Congress, 2 d  
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Washicgton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1980. p .  2511-2665. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. S ~ r a t e g i c  
weapons proposals. Hearings, 97th Congress, 1st session. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981 197 p. 
Hearings held Nov. 3 ,  4, and 9 ,  1981. 
2 E ? O X S  AND C3NGRESSIONAL DOCUKENTS 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs./ Senate. 
Committee on Foreign Relations. Fiscal year 1982 arms 
control impact statements. Statements submitted to the 
Congress by the President pursuant to section 36 of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Washington: U.S. 
Govt. Print. Off. 1981. ICBM programs, p. 1-71. 
At head of title: 97th Congress, 1st session. Joint 
committee print. 
OTHER CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
12/03/81 -- The Senate rejected, 35-60, an amenCment by Sen. Pryor to 
delete funding for interim silo hardening for MX, and 
rejected, 
46-47, an amendment by Sen. Proxmire to delete a 3% cost 
a















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































will use linear roads, separate transporter and 
erector-launcher vehicles, "loading dock" shelters, 
and mass simulators. 
09/07/79 -- President Carter announced his plan to deploy MX in the 
so-called '*racetrackw system of shell-game multiple 
protective structures. 
01/17/77 -- Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense ucder :he Ford 
Administration, stated in his FY78 DO3 Annual Report that 
"the prinary basing concepts, at this time, consist of 
concealing mobile (MX) missiles in either underground 
trenches or hardened shelters11 -- i.e., some form of 
IitUltiple protective shelters. 
For earlier. chronology, contact che CRS Issue Briefs Distribution 
Center. 
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